So far we’ve explored three external conceptual problems for the soft determinist/Calvinist view of freedom, and, thus the Calvinist view of election. Yet there are still two more external conceptual problems we must consider before drawing a final conclusion.
Month: June 2020
Last week I suggested our common experience of character formation is incompatible with the soft determinist view of freedom. Since Calvinism depends on soft determinism being true, this is another external conceptual problem for Calvinism. Yet the Calvinist may object on theological grounds. I’ll explore this response today.
We all desire to become better people. And so we work toward this goal. This includes choosing the beliefs and desires we will embrace and act upon. These choices in turn form our character. This common experience must fit our view of freedom. Yet, this reality doesn’t fit well with the soft determinist’s understanding of freedom. This is another external conceptual problem for soft determinism, and therefore, for Calvinism, which depends on soft determinism’s definition of freedom being true.
(I’m interrupting my series on Predestination vs. Free Will to share some thoughts on the events of the past few weeks.) The horrific murder of George Floyd once again causes us to stop and ask hard questions about our culture. As Christians we are called to be agents of peace, truth, and justice. But doing so requires an understanding of how to think Christianity about this responsibility in our current cultural moment.