On September 24, 2024, Geoff Holsclaw interviewed Jim Wilder on Holsclaw’s podcast Attaching to God, in an episode entitled “Why You Haven’t Given Up on the Soul If Speaking About The Brain (Jim Wilder).” Though my recently published Have We Lost Our Minds? Neuroscience, Neurotheology, the Soul, and Human Flourishing was not specifically named, the podcast discussion is clearly responding (at least in part) to what I write in my book. Therefore, I would like to offer a few thoughts in response, in order to clarify my points and the concerns I and other have concerning Wilder’s anthropology and its disastrous implications. (Note: the podcast audio is currently unavailable, so I’m replying to the transcript).
First, I am encouraged my book is generating good conversations, for discussing important ideas like these is a case of “iron sharpening iron” (Prov. 27:17). But to do so well we must engage the ideas of others accurately. For this reason, before writing my book I very carefully read Jim Wilder’s Renovated: God, Dallas Willard, and the Church That Transforms. I then cited his book extensively and reply to his specific claims (as well as those of Curt Thompson). Unfortunately, it does not seem Geoff Holsclaw or Jim Wilder carefully read my book before publishing this podcast in response. In fact, Holsclaw states, “I’ve even heard there’s a whole book that’s come out…that basically says talking about neuroscience is a distraction to spiritual formation or to sanctification or to discipleship,” which seems to imply he’s only heard of my book, but has not read any of it. Further indication of this are the many broad statements of what Wilder and Holsclaw believe I am claiming in my book, without any reference to my specific claims to this effect, and in fact misunderstanding or misrepresenting my claims repeatedly in the podcast.
Therefore, in what follows I hope to clarify seven specific areas of misunderstanding that surface during this podcast. I begin with Holsclaw’s introduction where he states, “Recently, people like Jim Wilder have been specifically accused [of] talking too much about the brain, and not [enough] about the soul. So much so that some believe Jim doesn’t even believe in the soul.”
In my book I do claim that a number of the passages in Wilder’s Renovated (and his other books) do seem clearly to equate our immaterial dimension (“soul,” “mind,” “heart,” “spirit,” or however else it is identified) with our material dimension, such as his claim that, “Mind comes from the same brain structures that produce mindfulness and mindsight.” (Renovated, p. 37; see here for a longer list of such reductionistic passages). In the podcast Wilder distances himself from this form of physicalism, equating this with a more reductionistic form of neurotheology, and suggests that I am misunderstanding him. Yet these and other passages in Renovated do seem to be in this more reductionistic line of thinking. So it would be helpful for Wilder to clarify in what way he disagrees with the more reductionistic “wing” of neurotheology.
Furthermore, in my book I suggest one way he may be distancing himself from this more reductionistic understanding. An alternative way to read some of his statements in Renovated is him believing a soul or “soul-like” properties in some way emerge from the brain (for instance, “Our brain creates and maintains a human identity.” Renovated, p. 68; the above citation from p. 37 may also be understood non-reductively, and again see this link for other examples).
Yet as I also clarify in my book, this is still a form of physicalism (specifically non-reductive physicalism), in which we do have immaterial aspects, but they emerge from, are caused by, and are ultimately dependent on the brain for their existence—analogous to smoke’s being different from, but emerging from and ultimately being dependent on fire for its existence. My argument is that perhaps Wilder is a non-reductive physicalist, believing in an immaterial dimension or “soul” of this type. However, this is still ultimately a physicalist view inconsistent with the biblical view that our immaterial dimension is a substantial soul—a soul that exists in its own right and doesn’t depend on the brain for its existence, functioning, or continuance. In support of us being a substantial soul I cite the rich biblical data outlined so well in John Cooper’s Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate.
This may seem like an insignificant distinction (between an emergent soul or soul-like properties, on the one hand, and a substantial soul, on the other). Yet it is of critical importance. Without believing we have a substantial soul, many other biblical truths are also at risk (as my book outlines in some detail).
Making these important distinctions is precisely what Dallas Willard was concerned about at the end of his life to ensure the spiritual formation movement continues on the right path—which requires “the spiritual formation movement be established on more intellectually rigorous philosophical and theological underpinnings” (as quoted by JP Moreland from a conversation he and Dallas had in Dallas’ last months cited in my book, p. 10). Dallas echos the importance of thinking hard and well about the nature of the soul, and making such important distinctions, when he said elsewhere, “We accept that someone spends years becoming a dentist and even more years training to become a surgeon, but we do not accept that we need to spend years giving serious thought to the nature of the soul.” (Johnson et al., Dallas Willard’s Study Guide to The Divine Conspiracy, p. 2.)
So I appeal to all engaging in this conversation to make the issue about whether a substantial soul exists, what it is, and how it relates to the body (including the brain). These are the crucial questions we must discuss and determine (not the more simplistic “I believe in a soul” without clarifying exactly what this means, as is done throughout the podcast).
The podcast then engages in a discussion assuming interpersonal neurobiology is an accurate description of the activities and properties of the brain, such as the claim that “…interpersonal neurobiology…[is] looking at the formation of identity and what goes on with that based on attachment, it turns out. And so the brain is a pretty busy duplication system where it copies the people that it’s engaged with and out of that duplication and interaction, it forms basically a sense of who we are and how we’re going to control our lives. And you can see that growing and developing across life.” Along these lines, the brain is also said to be responsible for emotional regulation, learning, consciousness, and much more.
However, this is simply reasserting that the brain is ultimately responsible for what I argue the soul is ultimately responsible for. Assigning these properties to the brain is precisely the physicalist understanding I’m critiquing (whether of the reductive or non-reductive variety). By simply reasserting these are ultimately brain functions, the podcasters egregiously evade a main point of my book. Again, this is where first reading my book and considering my arguments would have been very helpful to this conversation.
Third, there seems to be a complete misunderstanding of my discussion of our ability to live on after the death of our bodies (and brains). My point in the book is that, we know from Scripture that we live after the death of our bodies. Therefore, we must ultimately be that thing which endures, i.e. a substantial soul that has a body (while still emphasizing the value of the body while embodied, now and in the final resurrection). But the podcast conversation indicates I am misunderstanding the fact that neuroscience is studying us as embodied beings, and so I’m making a “category error” when speaking of our disembodied existence after death, as if I’m arguing that since we live on without our body, what we learn from neuroscience is not important for our understanding of our selves while embodied. This is not my argument at all. In fact, in the book I repeatedly affirm the value of studying neuroscience in order to learn important facts about our embodiment (and that neuroscientific data actually supports the arguments I offer in favor of us ultimately being a substantial soul). So my point is simply not understood here by Wilder or Holsclaw, and therefore their critique widely misses the mark.
Furthermore, Wilder claims he is only speaking of the neuroscientific data in his writings, and not the implications regarding what we are, or the nature of the soul. He states, “neurotheology is…a very specific focused field where we’re trying to figure out ‘how does the brain learn?’” He argues that just because he is not speaking of the soul in this context doesn’t mean he doesn’t believe a soul exists.
But this is precisely the problem—he is claiming more than the data of science. He is claiming the brain learns (as well as creates character, etc.–again see more examples here). At this point he is doing theological/philosophical anthropology, of which a central issue is whether it is the brain that thinks, learns, desires, etc., or the soul that does so (using the brain). He is adopting a specific anthropology by grounding properties historically understood to be properties of the substantial soul as actually properties of the brain (or emerging from the brain). So the claims he is making about neurotheology are, in fact, claims about the nature of the soul (that it is not substantial, but at best emergent).
In response, my basic argument is that this anthropology is wrong–historically, biblically, and philosophically the process of learning, creating character, etc. are functions of the substantial soul, not the brain (but again, using the brain while embodied). It is precisely this implicit physicalism (even if of the non-reductive variety) that has such dire consequences (my chapters 9 and 10).
Similarly, I am critiqued for “whenever you [Wilder] make it sound like the brain is doing all these things that only the soul should be doing, people have read that uncharitably, I think, to mean that you don’t believe in the soul.” This is not my argument. I do not believe that “only” the soul should be involved in these activities (thinking, feeling, choosing, etc.) and state so explicitly throughout my book (for instance, “two-way causal connections between the body and soul occur in all our interactions with the world.’ p. 102, and see all of my chapter 6, “The Unity of the Soul and the Body”). Rather, my argument is that Wilder writes as if the brain is only, or ultimately, doing “these things” rather than ultimately the soul doing these things, using the brain. If he is right, I argue it follows we are most fundamentally a brain, even if we do have an (emergent) soul (or “soulish things” as Holsclaw says here). Again, the dire consequences I outline in the book follow from this view.
Fourth, the claim is made that “criticisms have…come from…the older philosophical tradition…that talks about immaterial soul and then it’s different faculties.” It seems this is claiming the historical understanding of us as a substantial soul with its various faculties (mental faculty, volitional faculty, emotional faculty, etc.) are “old” or “outdated” (the context of this quote in the podcast is a conversation about the “new” ideas of the brain having a slow and fast track that now explains so much of our “mental” life.). If so, Wilder is here clearly nodding toward physicalism, as opposed to some form of dualism. Yes, the view of a substantial soul is “old,” grounded in Aristotle, Plato, and the biblical authors. But that doesn’t make it wrong (cf. CS Lewis’ arguments against “chronological snobbery,” on which I’ve written about here). Furthermore, many contemporary theologians and philosophers hold this view as well (such as John Cooper, Dallas Willard, JP Moreland, Rob Koons, etc., all referenced in my book).
Fifth, a conversation ensues in the podcast concerning the biblical terms used for the person, emphasizing the use of the term “heart” rather than “soul.” No reference is made to the biblical data discussed in length in my chapter 2, which shows why the best way to summarize the biblical data is by the term “holistic dualism”—we are a substantial soul, deeply united with our bodies.
Sixth, the analogy Dallas Willard uses for the soul-body relation, which I also use in my book, is unfairly criticized. Dallas employs the analogy of us using our bodies to live well in the world being like a person using an earthmover to accomplish his ends. Similar analogies are a person driving a car (JP Moreland uses this analogy) or a person riding a bicycle (the analogy criticized in the podcast). It is argued this analogy entails the body is a mere machine, which we are only loosely connected to (and even trapped in, with the goal of being released from this unnatural embodiment).
I agree this is a problem for my view if this is what I (and Willard and Moreland) mean. But in my book I am very clear that this view (technically known as Cartesian dualism) is not what I or Willard or Moreland are suggesting. While the soul uses the body to engage the world (the only point of the analogy), the body is not “just” a machine, and our soul’s relation to the body is not “unnatural” and “limiting” to our flourishing. Again, my book argues for “holistic dualism”–the view that the body is an expression of the soul and therefore is our natural mode of being, in this life and (after the intermediate state and the final resurrection) forevermore. This is another error due to not giving my book a careful reading, as this is a main point I make throughout my book.
And note the alternative analogy offered of a rider on a horse being better is problematic, for now you have two souls—the soul of the person and the soul of the horse—which raises many other disanalogies and makes it irrelevant to the critique being offered of my/Willard’s view. (For the idea of animals having souls see my chapter 8, relying on many throughout church history, including C.S. Lewis.)
Finally, there is a discussion of other “inanimate” things, like computers, learning and having a “value system,” and therefore the brain also being able to learn and have a value system. However, this begs the question as to whether computers are actually learning and have “values,” or simply following algorithms (which are written by minds in the first place). Physicalists assume computers “think” and can “learn.” But this is precisely what I am arguing is not supported by Scripture or philosophy. Once again, it seems implicit physicalism (of some sort) is surfacing, and no reply to my arguments against this understanding is offered.
More could be said of a number of other points made in the podcast, but hopefully what I’ve said corrects some of the many misunderstandings expressed during the conversation and clarifies what I am and am not arguing in my book.
I would be happy to be a guest on Geoff Holsclaw’s podcast to clarify or develop anything I’ve written here or in Have We Lost Our Minds.
Sincerely,
Stan W. Wallace