Introduction 

In June 2024 I published Have We Lost Our Minds? Neuroscience, Neurotheology, the Soul, and Human Flourishing (hereafter HWLOM). My main point was that a proper understanding of what we are is of crucial importance. As Marilyn Robinson, in her book Absence of Mind puts it,  “Whoever controls the definition of mind controls the definition of humankind itself.” In his review of Absence of Mind, Rowan Williams rightly observes, “The more the definition of mind is left to the parascientist – to Dennett and Dawkins and to reductive neurologists such as Steven Pinker and Michael Gazzaniga – the more political, moral and imaginative trouble we are corporately in.”¹ The importance of this issue is also highlighted by the Lausanne Movement: “Today, the world is absorbed with the question, ‘What does it mean to be human?’ This makes the Christian doctrine of the human person critically important. How we answer this question has profound implications for our witness in the world and our life in the church.”²

Due to the importance of this issue, in HWLOM I raised concerns over the physicalistic understanding of human persons that seems to underlie the works of Curt Thompson and Jim Wilder. I argue their anthropology seems to go against the grain of Scripture and reason, and thereby inhibits aspects of human flourishing. See HWLOM Introduction and Chapters 1, 9, and 10 where I delve further into some of these concerns.

Life Model Works, the organization with which Jim Wilder serves, recently published a reply to my book on their website entitled “Beyond a Slow Soul with a Radiator” (Hereafter “SSR,” available here). It was “written and approved by a group and represents the Life Model Works organization as the guardians of the model,”  according to Michael Sullivant, Life Model Works CEO (personal email on October 25, 2024).

I am glad to continue this conversation, not only because of its contemporary salience for the church but also in our pursuit of truth as we seek to understand God and others well. Where I am wrong I appreciate correction, and read SSR with great interest. I found points on which we seem to agree, points we seem to still disagree, and points in which I believe SSR misunderstood my argument. In what follows is my attempt to clarify these three areas, in the hope that my comments will further the conversation in helpful ways.

Areas We Seem to Agree

I begin by observing nine, and possibly ten areas of agreement between what I wrote in HWLOM and the SSR response. However, some of these points of agreement surface in the context of SSR’s critiques of my book. Therefore, I fear I failed to communicate well. In this section I’ll identify these points of agreement and, where needed, clarify the points I was making.

1. The Value of Neuroscience

SSR identifies neurotheology as “the study of the intersection of theology and the nervous system—including the brain.” (p. 1) I deeply agree that we must integrate all we know from brain science into our theology, because God is the source of all truth, no matter its source because knowledge (See HWLOM pp. 9, 10, 13, 26, 29, 179).

2. The Crucial Role our Brains Play in Our Mental Life

SSR states in a number of places the unity of soul and body. For instance, “Rather than a spooky soul operating a mechanical body (perhaps remotely but who can tell) we have a unified body and soul together,” “…the soul learns through the body’s physical experiences and its sense of reality is shaped accordingly.” (p. 3) and “We need to move beyond the…model of being human where our thinking takes place somewhere outside the body…” (p. 5, see also similar statements on pp. 1, 2, 7, 8, 9)

I couldn’t agree more. Much of my book is to argue against this view (Cartesian Dualism—the idea we are a “ghost in a machine”) and in favor of Holistic Dualism (the idea that we are a functional unity, and so the body, including the brain, is integral to our functioning and flourishing). For instance, see HWLOM Chapter 6, “The Unity of the Soul and the Body”.­ Therefore, the brain is deeply involved in thinking, learning, feeling, choosing, etc., and if it is damaged, these abilities are hindered (see HWLOM pp. 83-4). So, for instance, the case of Mary’s multiple personalities (SSR pp. 11-13) is not a problem for Holistic Dualism, but what we should expect given this deep causal connection between the mind and the brain.

3. Our Ability to Retrain our Brains (Neuroplasticity)

SSR states, “We are running defective brains that have been damaged and also modeled themselves after the dysfunctional and sinful minds around them. This defective development has kept our brains from thinking the way God wants us to think….To correct the brain side, we need to address and teach the brain in the way the brain learns.” (p. 13, see also pp. 2 and 4). I completely agree. Sin has affected all reality, including our bodies and brains. Yet we are able to, with God’s help, redeem this brokenness. See HWLOM pages 51, 105, 127 for my comments about neuroplasticity.

4. The Incorrect Brain Physiology of Aristotle and Medieval Scholars

SSR argues, “We need to move beyond the…model of … the radiator on our necks keep our blood cool.” (pp. 5-6) and “In the middle ages, the dualist philosophers also didn’t understand how the brain worked…” (p. 21). We are in complete agreement here as well. As neuroscience develops (which I applaud, see HWLOM pp. 8-10), we continue to learn more and more about how the brain functions. We have indeed found the brain is not a radiator designed to cool the blood, which was Aristotle’s physiology.

However, in HWLOM I am not citing or defending the physiology of Aristotle, much less arguing it is correct. Rather, I am citing his understanding of the human person—his anthropology. This is in the domain of philosophy, not the domain of physiology. My main point is that his philosophical anthropology is consistent with Scripture and helps fill in details about the nature of our souls, bodies, and their relationship (see HWLOM Chapters 5 and 6).

For this reason HWLOM does not focus on the scientific data concerning the brain (as SSR states, “[Moreland/Wallace] show little knowledge about the brain and its functions.” p. 21). While I do discuss the relevant findings of neuroscience (correlations between neural and mental events and neuroplasticity, pp. 15-16), a more detailed discussion is not relevant to HWLOM. To make this point I say “Due to these facts of neuroscience being relatively uncontroversial, I won’t spend more time discussing neuroscience per se. My concern is how these findings relate to what we are and how we flourish.” (p. 16). Thus my focus is how best to interpret the findings of neuroscience via theology and philosophy, the domains concerned with discovering our essential nature (unless one assumes physicalism and scientism, and thus assume physiology tells us what it is to be human). This is also why I don’t spend time discussing the history of brain studies, for instance the physiology of Galen as discussed in SSR pp. 20, 22. 

5. I Focus Only on Wilder’s Renovated in My Critique

My books is narrow in scope and thus is focused on the one disagreement I have with Wilder (and other neurotheologians): the risks of speaking as if the brain is the ultimate source of our thinking, desiring, choosing, forming our character, or the ground of our very identity—which are physicalistic claims with implications that I believe will impede human flourishing and the spiritual formation of the Body of Christ. Yet, for reasons I discuss in HWLOM p. 7, I focus only on Wilder’s Renovated. SSR states the same: “Wallace[’s] understanding of Wilder is limited to one half of one of Wilder’s books.” (p. 14). So we agree as to the specific text being evaluated.

However, I reviewed Wilder’s other books and found the same underlying anthropology, and so stated, “Wilder and Thompson have both written a number of other books, which echo similar themes.” ( HWLOM p. 7, fn. 12) Further evidence that I think I discerned Wilder’s anthropology correctly is SSR itself, which reaffirms this basic physicalistic anthropology (see “SSR Reaffirms Physicalism” and “SSR Reaffirms Scientism” below) of which Wilder at least approved (see Sullivant’s comment above).

As a side note, I actually engaged more than “one half” of Renovated, contrary to the claim made is SSR p 14. I also quoted extensively from the chapters containing Willard’s thought, often in the context of illustrating where Willard and Wilder disagree on the nature of the human person and hence the implications for spiritual maturity and flourishing. See, for instance, HWLOM pp. 118-22.

6. Most of HWLOM’s Critiques Lie Outside Neurotheology

SSR claims that “most of the critiques of Wilder’s neurotheology…lies outside the field of neurotheology.” (SSR p. 16). Indeed they do, which I also state and give reasons for (see HWLOM pp. 45-6). In sum, this is because I am engaging neurotheologian’s underlying philosophical and theological anthropology (claims about what human persons essentially are), rather than claims about how our physical bodies/brains function (physiology). Therefore, my reply is based on what we know about the nature of human persons from theology and philosophy.

7. Dallas Willard’s Affirmation of The Life Model

SSR observes that, “Dallas Willard declared [the Life Model] to be the best model he had seen for rebuilding Christian community.” (SSR p. 19). Yes he did, and I say as much in HWLOM (p. 119). However, I go on in that section (HWLOM pp. 119-122) to put this endorsement in context and show why this is not an endorsement of neurotheology’s physicalistic anthropology.

8. Jim Wilder Has Helped Many

SSR claims that, “Proof that [Wilder’s Life Works Model] is working well comes from the list of churches, groups, and movements who have used the Life Model without finding any conflict with what they believe.” (p. 18) Again, I agree with what the authors of SSR write here, and say the same in HWLOM pp. 130-31. However, this doesn’t engage the concern of my book: that when proving pastoral advice, neurotheologians are very helpful, but that neurotheologians are helpful to others in spite of, not in virtue of their physicalism (HWLOM pp. 122-29). My further concern is that, even if helpful temporarily, the risks entailed by this anthropology impede loving God (HWLOM chapter 9) and loving others (HWLOM chapter 10) well.

9. Jim Wilder’s Dates at Fuller Seminary Do Not Overlap with Murphy or Green (We Now Agree)

SSR states that, “Wallace attributes Wilder’s supposed views…to studying under two Fuller professors Joel Green and Nancey Murphy….Wilder never heard of either professor..” (p. 19). I stand corrected, and am very willing to acknowledge this factual error. I certainly should have double-and even triple-checked these dates to avoid this error. My apologies. Nevertheless, this factual error does not undermine the substance of my argument, which is based on what Wilder writes in Renovated, regardless of its source (see below under “SSR Claims My Case is Made on What Wilder Didn’t Say, Not What He Did Say”).

To the best of my knowledge, Wilder’s dates at Fuller is the only historical error in HWLOM. Yet the authors of SSR claim HWLOM is “full of errors” (p. 19). As will be discussed below, the other alleged errors they cite seem to be in relation to misunderstandings of claims I’m making related to intellectual history/the history of ideas.

10. SSR May Represent a Shift Toward Affirming a Substantial Soul?

At some points, SSR seems to nod toward us as a substantial soul (of the Holistic Dualism variety). For instance, “…our eternal heart/soul/spirit/mind/eternal self was the true guide to our identity when it was perceived through the new heart that Jesus gives.” (p. 1), “…the design for the brain/body intended for it to work seamlessly with the eternal human spirit/soul/heart,” (p. 3) and “the soul also learns” (pp. 3-4, in relation to Jesus and others having conscious states after the death of the body/brain). Finally, “Our eternal being (that scripture sometimes calls the soul and other times the spirit) is not observable by any known science and therefore not the subject of neurotheology. But the operation of the brain in harmony (or not) with our eternal selves is observable and much can be learned.” (p. 4)

These few passages of SSR give me great hope. Granted, they may be echoing the view that the soul exists, yet emerges out of the brain (and so is not substantial, existing in its own right and able to live after the body dies). But, on the other hand, perhaps these are nods toward  an anthropology, along the lines I’ve argued, whereby we are ultimately a substantial soul which determines our character, produces our mental life, creates and maintains our identity, and is the source of attachment love (using the brain in all of this, as Holistic Dualism maintains).

Areas We Seem to Disagree

There seem to be ten main areas in which the authors of SSR disagree with HWLOM. Some may only be apparent disagreements, due to my failure to communicate my points well. In this section I’ll identify these potential areas of disagreement and do my best to clarify my intentions, in an effort to find even more common ground through this conversation.

1. SSR Doesn’t Believe This Is an Important Issue

SSR states that, “Wilder and the LifeWorks Model have no dog in the race over the characteristics of the soul.” (p. 24) I’ve argued that understanding the characteristics of the soul (both that it exists and its nature) is significant, for it determines how we flourish. In addition to making this point in the Introduction (p. 4), I illustrate the implications of the various views of what we are in chapters 9 and 10. This is why neuroethology’s anthropology (cf. SSR p. 19) and it’s logical implications diminish our understanding of human being by denying  a substantial soul. If we aren’t a substantial soul, then we’re not able to flourish in the various ways in which I outlined in HWLOM.

2. SSR Claims My Case is Made on What Wilder Didn’t Say, Not What He Did Say

SSR states, “Wallace makes his case based on what Wilder didn’t say (rather than what he did say)…” (p. 14) and “His accusations, based largely on assumptions, are things Wilder never said or taught.” (p. 19)

Throughout HWLOM I quote precisely what Wilder did say concerning our nature, including such statements as “Brain functions…determine our character.” (Renovated, p. 6), and “Our brain creates and maintains a human identity.” (Renovated, p. 68, see Chapter 1 for more). Reading these and other passages gives the sense that the brain is what we ultimately are, and gives rise to all other realities, including our character and very identity. I’m curious as to how these claims fit with what was previously said in point ten above. So it is to these things that Wilder (and Thompson) did say that I respond.

3. SSR Reaffirms a Physicalist Anthropology

In HWLOM I define physicalism such that ultimately it is the brain that thinks, feels, believes, chooses, acts, creates character, and makes us what we are. I cite James Sire’s summary of a physicalist’s anthropology on p. 21: “Human beings are complex ‘machines’; personality is an interrelation of chemical and physical properties we do not yet fully understand.”

Yet the authors of SSR reaffirm this understanding of the human person. For instance, “The human spirt starts with a cell…” (p. 1), “…loving attachment comes first in the brain processes that create and maintain identity.” (p. 1), “The brain must learn to follow Jesus …. This is the basic neurotheology for the Life Model.” (p.1), “The brain thinks about different things at different speeds.” (p. 2), “the brain can learn and change.” (p. 6), “The nervous system has many wills…the cortex of the brain can also have different wills. Sometimes what one part of the brain wants another part of the brain greatly opposes.” (p. 10), “The brain thinks faster than conscious speed.” (p. 15), and, “Wallace’s dependence on a slow soul seems to arise from his need to combat belief in the emergence of consciousness from physical matter…” (p. 23).

This is precisely the physicalistic anthropology I’m identifying and critiquing in HWLOM and showing why we must affirm it is the (substantial) soul that thinks, learns chooses, etc. with a brain, rather than ascribe those properties as arising from the brain, as the physicalist does. (Again, while always affirming the deep causal connection between soul and body, such that we should expect the findings of brain research that identifies how the soul uses the brain in thinking and engaging the world through the five senses. See HWLOM Chapters 3, 4, and 6).

4. SSR Reaffirms Scientism

The authors of SSR repeatedly state that we can have knowledge of physical reality (studied by science) but not of immaterial reality (studied by, among others, theologians and philosophers). For instance, “Emergence and all other theories of conscious thought and agency lie beyond the current range of human knowledge and understanding.” (p. 24). SSR also claims, “Spiritual substance cannot be examined. Philosophers attribute whatever qualities they need to explain the result they want.” (p. 24), and “Wallace cannot explain anything about the substance and functions of the soul…” (p. 23). These statements privilege empirical knowledge attained through scientific study over what is known through philosophical or theological investigation. Such notions exhibit the characteristics of scientism.

In HWLOM I grant that immaterial realities such as a spiritual substance can’t be examined scientifically. However, rejecting scientism (see HWLOM pp. 114-18 for reasons to reject scientism), I argue that it can be examined via the tools of theology and philosophy, and so we can have knowledge of its nature and function (and therefore, not just any quality can be ascribed to the soul). See HWLOM Chapter 2 for what we can know of the soul via theology, and Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 for what we can know of the soul via philosophy (and specifically Chapters 4, 5, and 6 for a discussion of what consciousness is and features of our consciousness).

5. SSR Insists Wilder is Not a Physicalist

Yet, even with this reaffirmation of physicalism and scientism in SSR (which is at least endorsed, if not partially written by Wilder) the authors go on to claim, “Those who have heard Wilder teach agree that he is not a physicalist, or an epiphenomenlist. His approach is also not the scientism claimed by Wallace.” (p. 19). Whether he sees himself endorsing physicalism (and scientism) or not, my point is he writes as if he is (in Renovated, in his other books, and now again in SSR). Hence, I wrote HWLOW out of concern for human flourishing and the spiritual formation of the church because of the implications a physicalist anthropology, which seems to be informing contemporary neurotheology. (See also my discussion of related issues in “Correcting Errors in Jim Wilder and Geoff Holsclaw’s Discussion of my Book” here.)

6. SSR Believes Wilder is Only Doing Neurotheology

The authors of SSR argue that “Wilder generally stays within the limits of neurotheology in his writings and does not try to explain topics that better fit theology or philosophy.” (p. 17) However, as I discuss in HWLOM pp. 42-3, all science involves interpretation, which are based on theological and philosophical assumptions.  Once Wilder makes arguments and draws conclusions about what persons are, he is engaging in theological and philosophical anthropology (as discussed in HWLOM Chapter 3 and contrary to SSR’s claim that “Moreland [and Wallace] …goes far beyond neurotheology with assured knowledge about the nature and substance of the soul. Wilder stays much more closely in his field.” [p. 17]). This is the main concern I and others have with neurotheology: when he begins making statements about what we are (anthropology) which are “outside his field,” he should include in the conversations (and rely on in his writings) those with training in anthropology—theologians and philosophers. Otherwise, as I point out in HWLOM, claims are made about what we are that imply physicalism, whether intentional or not, which causes deep confusion among readers, even leading readers to deny the soul exists altogether.

7. SSR Suggests Moreland is a Neurotheologian

SSR seems to read Moreland’s writings, especially his recent Finding Quiet, as another form of neurotheology (see SSR pp. 14). This is based on Moreland’s belief in neuroplasticity. Yet a careful reading of Finding Quiet, as well as other books Moreland has written³, makes it clear that he is a Holistic Dualist (or in his terms, a “Thomistic-Like Dualist”—see HWLOM pp. 109-11 for the various terms used to identify our view). This anthropology affirms the vital role our brains play in our flourishing, and thus the need to reshape our brain accordingly (see my discussion of neuroplasticity in HWLOM p. 127). Yet for Moreland (and me) it is the substantial soul that is shaping the brain, not the brain shaping itself. Therefore, to affirm the importance of neuroplasticity does not make Moreland (or me) a neurotheologian.

8. SSR Seems to Assume Certainty is Required for Knowledge

Descartes bequeathed to us the unlivable epistemology that we can only claim to know something if we can be 100% sure. Hence the skeptical objection often heard by Christian apologists, “But are you certain? If not, you really don’t know it is true. This view of knowledge (“Cartesian certainty”) seems to have been adopted by the authors of SSR to argue one cannot have knowledge of the nature or operations of the soul, or the limits of the brain, because certain knowledge is not possible. For instance, “[Moreland/Wallace] do not prove conclusively that the brain cannot learn.” (p. 17), “Wallace/Moreland repeatedly insist that philosophy has discovered some truth when they mean they are following Thomas Aquinas. There were plenty of critics of Aquinas” (p. 21), and “The most pervasive tendency by Wallace is to state contested views as though they were the clear and only facts in philosophy….Does he simply not know or is he deliberately creating an illusion of clarity and certainty? ” (p. 20-21)

There are many reasons to reject Cartesian certainty as the criterion for knowledge, including the fact that science never gives us 100% certainty, and so every view has its critics, yet we still are justified in claiming to have knowledge through scientific inquiry. In philosophy and theology, as in science, we can claim to know something is the case if we have evidence and reason which makes it more probable than its contrary. Therefore, Cartesian certainty is not assumed in HWLOM (see, for example, pp. 10, 25, 28-29, and 82). Rather, I offer evidence and reasoning to show why Holistic Dualism is more reasonable than physicalism at discerning the truth (specifically arguments based on the biblical data, our free will, our reason, our first-person perspective, our unity at a time, and our unity through time). Yes, HWLOM did in fact “state contested views as though they were the clear” (SSR p. 20) but only after discussing the reasons to believe the view is most reasonable. Finally, doing so does bring clarity, but clarity is not an illusion if based on solid evidence and reasoning.

Finally, if a critique at all, this concern is much more applicable to Wilder’s Renovated that HWLOM. Applied to Renovated, Wilder, in the words of SSR, “state[s] contested views as though they were the clear.…goes far beyond neurotheology with assured knowledge about the nature and substance [of the person]….do[es] not prove conclusively that the brain [can] learn…repeatedly insist[s] that [neurotheology] has discovered some truth when they mean [he is] following [physicalists like Alan Schore’s ideas such as ‘how our right hemisphere regulates emotion and processes our sense of self’⁴]. There [are] plenty of critics of [physicalists such as Schore]….The most pervasive tendency by [Wilder] is to state contested views as though they were the clear and only facts in [interpretations of the data of neuroscience]….Does he simply not know or is he deliberately creating an illusion of clarity and certainty?”

9. SSR Questions the Level of Scholarship in HWLOM

Finally, in SSR’s Addendum the authors claim, “reviews…by people with doctoral degrees in a variety of subjects conclude that [HWLOM] is full of errors, poor logic, incorrect histories, wrong assumptions, narrow selection of sources and a lack of fact checking.” (p. 19) This criticism missed the mark in a number of ways.

First, it’s not helpful in moving the conversation forward to refer to objectors who are not named. Their assessment of HWLOM is only as good as their expertise in anthropology. I was careful to do so in HWLOM by providing extensive footnotes in order to document those with the relevant training in support of my claims. Furthermore, I chose not to cite one source highly critical of Wilder’s Renovated (www.no2Renovated.com), which I believe offered some important critiques—especially related to Wilder’s interpretation of Willard—because, hard as I tried, the author would not reveal his or her identity.

Second, reviewers willing to be named do not agree HWLOM is “full of errors, poor logic,…wrong assumptions….” On the contrary, named reviewers with the requisite academic training overwhelmingly endorse HWLOM.

Finally, J.P. Moreland’s credentials as a careful thinker are widely known, having published extensively in academic journals on these issues. So much more is required than a statement by unknown reviewers that he, in his endorsement of what I write in HWLOM and making the same claims in his more academic writings, is guilty of such errors, logical fallacies, and wrong assumptions.

SSR goes on to suggest HWLOM is full of “…incorrect histories…and a lack of fact checking.” I have acknowledged the one historical inaccuracy above concerning Wilder’s dates at Fuller. The others SSR seem to have in mind revolve around the history of ideas. For instance, “Wallace labels Wilder’s ideas as physicalism and attributes those to the Enlightenment without be able to cite any Enlightenment thinker who held the same ideas.” (SSR p. 21). But it is uncontroverted in the literature that the Enlightenment was the seedbed of physicalism as we know it today (though it certainly existed prior to this point of intellectual history, going back to Democritus ([460-370 B.C.]). For instance, see James Sire’s conversation of “Swing figures in [the] shift from theism to naturalism…especially between 1600 and 1750…[which] set the stage by conceiving of the universe as a giant mechanism of ‘matter’….”⁵ It is also to this shift on which C.S. Lewis based his Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge University (“De Descriptione Temporum,” 1954). Furthermore, I do discuss perhaps the central Enlightenment thinker who endorsed physicalism: David Hume (see HWLOM pp. 69-70, 76).

So there seem to be no other historical errors beyond Wilder’s dates at Fuller. If there are others, I would appreciate knowing exactly what they are, to be able to comment further. Otherwise, one historical error does not make HWLOM “…full of errors…incorrect histories…”

In this same passage SSR claims HWLOM relies on a “…narrow selection of sources…” Specifically, SSR is critical that I “…never mentions any of Allan Schore’s science that forms the basis for most of the science used by Life Model Neurotheology.” (p. 20). Yet I am not criticizing the findings of neuroscience, so in as far as Schore is doing science, I applaud his research. My concern is with how Wilder and Thompson are interpreting the data (see HWLOM pp. 42-3). The same critiques would also apply to Schore if he shares their faulty assumption that correlation of mental and brain states means identity (or at least causation)⁶—See HWLOM Chapter 3.

Similarly, SSR takes issue with me not engaging the ideas of Williamson and Zeiba (p. 23). This is true. There are thousands of thinkers throughout the ages who have offered ideas on these important matters. My objective was to keep the book to a readable length, and so I focused on highlighting the main issues and arguments, rather than every objection or alternative. Yet I was careful to include in the extensive footnotes many additional sources for those interested in drilling down to the next level and engaging a broader range of philosophers on these issues.

10. SSR Argues Animal Souls are a Problem for my Thesis

The authors of SSR argue against the Holistic Dualism of HWLOM because, “The logical conclusion…that anything that learns and changes must have a soul leads them to conclude that animals must have souls.” and “…then do animals have all the faculties?” (p. 6). But this is precisely what follows from Holistic Dualism, and has been believed by Christians for most of our history, as discussed in HWLOM pp. 144-46. It is also clarified in HWLOM p. 84 that different types of creatures have different capacities of soul, according to their soul type or natural kind, and only the human soul bears the Image of God, and all that entails (p. 85-8).

Areas it Seems There Is Some Misunderstanding

Beyond the areas of agreement and disagreement there are nine important points made in SSR which seem to be based on misunderstandings. In what follows I will offer a few words to clarify my intent. With this in mind, I suggest a careful re-reading of those sections of HWLOM, and where needed the additional sources referenced in the footnotes, is needed in order to move this conversation forward.

1. Misunderstanding the Central Role Scripture Plays in my Anthropology

SSR seems to believe I’m basing my anthropology on Aristotle (see, for instance, SSR pp. 2 and 3). However, I am clear that our anthropology must first and foremost be based on Scripture (HWLOM Chapter 2). Philosophy is then helpful to bring further understanding and nuance to what Scripture teaches (as I illustrate concerning the early creeds, HWLOM p. 26). So in Chapter 2 I outline how Scripture maintains that a substantial soul exists. I then, in subsequent chapters, offer Aristotle’s anthropology to further nuance the nature of the soul and its relation to the body. Therefore, the criticisms of HWLOM putting too much stock in Aristotle to justify the belief that a substantial soul exists is unfounded.

2. Misunderstanding Aristotle’s Understanding of the Soul and Body

In as far as I am utilizing the conceptual framework of Aristotle (and the many in his lineage, such as Aquinas, Pope John Paul II, Dallas Willard, and J.P. Moreland), I am endorsing his metaphysic, not his physiology, as discussed above in “Areas We Seem to Agree: The Incorrect Brain Physiology of Aristotle and Medieval Scholars”).

It is Aristotle’s metaphysic (specifically his anthropology—how he viewed the soul and the soul-body relation) that SSR seems to significantly misunderstand. For instance, SSR claims his anthropology is that of an “external soul made with faculties” (p. 3) and therefore, “For Aristotle the soul was riding a machine” and “a spooky soul operating a mechanical body (perhaps remotely but who can tell)” (p. 3). Elsewhere the soul is referred to as a “whimsical, spooky soul” (p. 22), and claiming that “Wallace/Moreland and their arguments [are] based on extreme dualism…” (p. 21). We further read that “Wallace Moreland are proponents of the slow soul with FACULTIES that don’t need or use the brain to think or learn” (p. 22) and that our view indicates that the brain needs to be “updated on what each soul faculty is doing” (p. 3).  This leads to the analogy in SSR of a rider and a horse (p. 3).

This evidences two confusions. First, for Aristotle the soul is in no way “external” but it is deeply wed to the body, forming a functional unity. In Plato, not Aristotle, do we find the idea of the soul being “external,” brought into the modern era by Descartes (so referred to as “Cartesian Dualism), the opposite of Aristotle’s Holistic Dualism for which I argue throughout HWLOM. In fact, I not only argue for Aristotelian Holistic Dualism (and thus the central role the brain plays in our flourishing), but throughout argue against Cartesian Dualism. Therefore, the many criticisms of HWLOM in SSR based on this misunderstanding are moot points.

This confusion also underlies SSR’s argument that the body has no causal efficacy on the soul. For instance, we read, “Being non-physical, what accounts for the soul speed? Why is all soul thinking not instantaneous?…Only if the brain is involved could there be slower slow tracks at all.” (p. 4). While a problem for Cartesian Dualism, this is precisely what we should expect given Holistic Dualism due to the deep functional unity of the person (for example, see HWLOM pp. 105-07).

3. Misunderstanding What a Substance Is

It seems the authors of SSR do not understand the metaphysical category of “substance,” and therefore my point that the soul is a substance (that we are a substantial soul). Specifically, it seems the authors of SSR are conceiving of substance, as I use it, along the lines of our modern definition of a substance: a physical thing of some sort, saying “It is parallel to physical substances in its nature.” (SSR p. 4), …this spiritual substance is contrived to be ‘physical like’…” (SSR p. 5) and calling it a “soul substance” (SSR pp. 6, 20, 24) that, like other physical things, can be studied by science: ““…through the 19^th century, the non-materialists hoped that eventually accurate science could identify it.” (SSR pp. 4-5), “They imagine the soul to be composed of some unknown and indescribably substance known only to Aristotle and philosophy but not to science.” (SSR p. 5), and “The question about the soul’s participation [in thinking] cannot be settled by any known science.” (SSR p. 15).

However, I am not using substance in this way. Rather the soul is a substance in that it is an immaterial reality that exists in its own right (is not generated by something more basic, such as the brain) and therefore stands under (“sub-stands”) and unifies all my parts and properties. As Dallas Willard says, “To understand spirit as ‘substance’ is of the utmost importance in our current world, which is so largely devoted to toe ultimacy of matter. It means that spirit is something that exists in its own right.” It is what “stands under” all the parts, properties, and capacities of a person, providing our unity both at and through time. This is what I am referring to as the substantial soul or the soul as a substance, a prominent idea in the history of Western thought for more than two millennia.

As such, it is not empirically observable so as to be subject to scientific study. Rather, we know that it exists, and its nature, by the fields that study such things, in this case theology and philosophy, which is the focus of HWLOM. Therefore, due to SSR’s confusing the scientific and theological/philosophical notions of a substance, their arguments based on the nature of a substance are irrelevant to the claims of HWLOM that we are ultimately a substantial soul, not ultimately a brain, and my six arguments to defend the soul as a substance (see HWLOM Chapters 2, 3, and 4 for these six arguments, contrary to SSR’s claim that I only offer an argument from consciousness (SSR p. 6).

One way this misunderstanding surfaces is SSR’s question, “If the soul substance (sic) directs the development of bodies, why does it generate ‘after their kind’ physically?” (SSR p. 20). This is actually a defining feature of substances, in light of the nature of the type of thing in question (in this case, human persons). I discuss this in HWLOM pp. 84, 89-90, and Chapter 6).

This misunderstanding also leads to SSR’s claim that “You can have a [substance] dualism where the brain does all the active work.” (SSR p. 5). Understanding the soul as a substance means just the opposite: that it is the soul that is the generator of thought, not the brain (though on the form of dualism I defend—Holistic Dualism—the soul uses the brain in the process of thinking. See HWLOM Chapter 6).

A very important outworking of this misunderstanding is the repeated claim that Wilder does in fact believe the soul exists (for instance, SSR p. 14, 15). But the issue is whether we are fundamentally an immaterial being (a substantial soul), or whether we are fundamentally a body/brain, from which a soul may emerge. Wilder claims the later is true: “Mind comes from the same brain structures that produce mindfulness and mindsight.” (Renovated, p. 37). This is Wilder’s non-reductive physicalism I suggest may be his view (rather than reductive physicalism) and critique in HWLOM pp. 55-61. (In light of this it is hard to know what SSR means when it claims “Wallace/Moreland are reductionists while Wilder is not.” [p. 23]. Clearly the opposite is true in relation to persons, the point of HWLOM.)

This also applies to the charge that since Wilder called his conference with Willard the “Heart and Soul” conference (which I do not deny was run by Wilder, contra SSR p. 20), then Wilder most certainly believe in the soul. Yet nothing in Renovated gives the reader any sense of his view of the soul as substantial, but rather identical to, or a function of, the brain (see HWLOM Chapter 3). Wilder may claim in interviews that he believes a soul exists, but in his writings he clearly ascribes to the brain all which historically have been functions of the soul (see here for some I discuss in the book—link to my book page). Therefore, careful readers of his writings get the clear sense that ultimately we are not spiritual being that can live apart from our bodies (as Scripture teaches), but rather that we are ultimately physical beings. I and Moreland have seen believers embrace this implicit physicalism more than once, which is a great concern.

4. Misunderstanding the Distinction Between the Soul and Its Parts

A related confusion is SSR’s claim that, “Wallace…says the soul is simple (no parts) and thus only the soul can experience the unity of consciousness.” (SSR p. 16) Actually, my claim was that the substantial soul had no separable parts (is “simple” in this sense, and reasons we should believe this to be true—see HWLOM pp. 66-70 and 82). Then on pages 82-86 I explain in what sense the soul is metaphysically complex (exhibiting multiple properties), and how this relates to a defining feature of a substance: that it “sub-stands” or stands under all its properties as a unifying whole (HWLOM pp. 93-4; see below). This is the distinction between the soul being mereologically simple yet metaphysically complex (HWLOM p. 82 fn. 4).

On this misunderstanding SSR bases arguments such as “Mary and the simple soul” and her many discrete states of consciousness (SSR p. 16). Again, these objections are moot once this confusion is cleared up.

5. Misunderstanding the Soul’s Hierarchy of Capacities

SSR wonders, “If consciousness is a function of the soul, what is blocking the soul [when we can’t access what we know]?”(p. 22). In HWLOM I go into some detail explaining how lower-order blockages (for instance, in the brain) prevent the soul from exhibiting some higher-order capacities (such as thinking). See pp. HWLOM pp. 83-93, 126, and discussions of neuroplasticity in several places.

6. Misunderstanding the Argument from Our First-Person Perspective

In HWLOM I argue that we know our mental states directly in a way no third-person description can capture (pp. 49-51). This is one reason to think the mind is necessarily not identical to the brain (given the Law of Identity). Yet SSR seems to take issue with this claim. First, it may because the authors confuse our first-person awareness with language use (“The aspect of consciousness that attracts non-empiricist philosophers in an ‘inner dialogue’ where thinking is manifest as language” SSR p. 4). But I am not referring to language at all, but rather our direct awareness of our mental states.

Second, there may be confusion as to what I am claiming at a deeper level. I am claiming we are directly aware of our mental states (say a belief) in a way no one else can be, because we can’t be wrong about what we are experiencing, yet others can be wrong about our inner experience. In this way the contents of our consciousness are transparent to us. Yet SSR seems to think I am claiming we can’t be wrong about the objective truth or falsity of the content of our beliefs, sating, “Wallace believes the mind is not blocked when it comes to seeing itself…cannot be wrong about what it knows.” (SSR p. 16). SSR offers the case of Mary, who has multiple personality disorder, and argues she has many beliefs about herself that are false, leading to many wrong emotions based on these false beliefs. I certainly agree that cases such as Mary’s show that people can be wrong about the accuracy of their beliefs and emotions. Yet this is not my point. I’m simply saying that Mary can’t be wrong about the experience she is having (her state of experiencing belief X or experiencing emotion Y—her phenomenal experience), even if those experiences (beliefs, emotions, etc.) do not map to the reality (the noumenal). Large sections of SSR make arguments against HWLOM based on this misunderstanding.

7. Misunderstanding the Fundamental Difference between Matter and Persons

SSR states, “Wallace insists that no explanation can be made as to how the brain makes choices. By the same logic no explanation can be made for how the soul makes choices.” (p. 23). But this misses the entire argument I’m making: that material things are determined (e.g. balls on a pool table), and people have free will (God being the paradigm case—see HWLOM p. 33), and our experience of free will, along with the assumption that others have free will (for instance, in assigning moral praise or blame), provides further evidence that we are not fundamentally material (see HWLOM pp. 51-3).

8. Misunderstanding the Implications of Life After Death

SSR argues that facts about our life after death are irrelevant to neurotheology, for it is only concerned with our embodied life, saying neurotheology “has nothing to say about our eternal existence during the time we lack bodies with a nervous system.” (p. 1)

Again, this misses the point. I am simply observing that if our mental life, and even our very self, is ultimately a function of our brain, it follows that when the brain stops functioning, all that neurotheologians claim depends on the brain must cease as well, including thoughts, beliefs, desires, attachments, our character, and our very selves. But Scripture is clear that we exist after we die, and continue to have thoughts, beliefs, desires, attachments, character, and identity. Therefore, we must not fully or primarily be a material brain, but an immaterial soul. See HWLOM Chapter 2.

9. Misunderstanding The Justification For “Knowing That” Without “Knowing How”

I argue that we can know something is true, without knowing how it is true, if we have other good reasons to justify this belief (such as the beliefs that we are individuals, p. 92, and the soul exists and is causally related to the body, p.135). I give examples of other things we have good reason to believe exist without fully understanding how they exist: the Trinity (p. 92) and the causal effect of quarks (p. 135). But the key element here is the we are justified to claim that these are truths without knowing how this is so if, and only if, we have other good reasons to justify this belief.

Yet SSR seems to miss this nuance, and assume I assume this principle should apply to all beliefs, including the belief I’m critiquing: that the brain can think, feel, and so on. For instance, “Wallace fails to apply the same logic to his arguments that he applies to his opponents.” (p. 23), and “If his opponents were to offer the same argument about emergence…Wallace would not accept that equivalent reasoning.” (p. 23).

However, I do apply the same logic. If there are good reasons to believe the brain thinks, one would be justified in believing this to be true, even though we don’t know how this is the case. Yet throughout HWLOM I have offered philosophical arguments that show the brain cannot think in light of the essential differences between mental events and neural events.

A Way Forward

I hope my observations here help further this good conversation about a most important  issue. I invite the authors of SSR to consider what I’ve written, and offer a public response to each of the three sections above for those following this conversation. Specifically:

(1)   Do we truly have agreement as I’ve outlined in Section One? If so, how would these clarifications lead to nuances or changes to what they wrote in SSR? If not, how would they clarify their points to highlight differences that remain on these points?

(2)   Is there any agreement on my ten clarifications in Section Two? If so, how SSR amend their argument in light of these clarifications? If not, where do they believe my arguments in this section miss the mark?

(3)  Do the nine misunderstandings I attempt to clear up in Section Three make sense? If so, how does this modify their view of those points addressed in SSR? If not, why not?

I look forward to continuing the conversation on this important topic directly related to our well-being and human flourishing, including the spiritual formation of the body of Christ. While I have likely made errors in judgment along the way, I hope these three sections not only lead to clarity but also begin to shape the place for some common ground.