Recently Geoff Holsclaw wrote a review of my Have We Lost Our Minds? Neuroscience, Neurotheology, the Soul, and Human Flourishing (Hereafter HWLOM). I greatly appreciate his agreement that this is an important conversation and his further contribution to advance this discussion. His review is thoughtful, identifying areas in HWLOM that require further clarification. He likewise suggests areas neruotheologians such as Jim Wilder and Curt Thompson must clarify to make clear what they are and are not claiming concerning what we are and how we flourish. He concludes by suggesting a recent book that looks very promising to further advance this conversation.
I agree with a number of good points that Holsclaw makes. Therefore, I will focus my comments below on the seven issues on which we seem to differ, and attempt to clarify several important emphases in HWLOM that might alleviate these disagreements. In this way, I hope my reply continues to advance this very important conversation. (Note Holsclaw also raised some of these concerns in his podcast with Jim Wilder here, to which I reply here.)
MY LIMITED ENGAGEMENT WITH WILDER, THOMPSON, AND OTHER NEUROTHEOLOGIANS
First, Holsclaw implies I should have engaged more of Wilder and Thompson’s works, and other authors beyond them, stating “The trouble is that Wallace does not engage these [other] perspectives or authors. He focuses instead on Curt Thompson and Jim Wilder, and only focuses on one book each (without reference to their other writings).” (paragraph 4).
The reason I focus only on Wilder and Thompson is that they are currently the most popular proponents of neuroscience among the audience HWLOM is written for: thoughtful Christian who have not done advanced study in anthropology, including many pastors and Christian counselors. I frame the book accordingly in my Introduction (especially pages 2-3 and 7).
Furthermore, on page 8 I state why I focus only on Renovated (Wilder) and Anatomy of the Soul (Thompson): these are their most prominent books. In these books, we also find their most detailed anthropology. I do note in footnote 12 on that page that “Wilder and Thompson have both written a number of other books, which echo similar themes.”
I continue to think focusing on these two popular neurotheologians and each of their most important books was the correct approach. Not only did this allow me to engage those having the greatest influence in our churches, but also kept my book at a readable length. However, I should have made these reasons for restricting my conversation to Wilder’s Renovated and Thompson’s Anatomy clearer in my Introduction.
THE ISSUE IS PHYSICALISM, NON-REDUCTIVE OR NOT
Second, in several places Holsclaw frames the debate I’m engaging as “between holistic dualists and reductive materialists.” (paragraph 2), and that I’m attempting “to show that Thompson and Wilder are reductive physicalists” (paragraph 4). From this, he argues that neurotheologians such as Wilder and Thompson are not reductive physicalists, in light of their ideas being drawn from the non-reductive interpersonal neurobiology of Dan Siegel and others. Siegel “emphasizes the three irreducible aspects of brain, mind, and relationships….While using the language of emergence and complexity, which, admittedly, are often connected to a kind of physicalism, Siegel is clear that the mind is not merely “in” the brain…” (paragraph 9). Since Siegel is not a reductive physicalist, and Wilder and Thomson follow Siegel, Holsclaw argues they are not reductive physicalists either.
Here Holsclaw misses the main point of my book. I am not engaging the debate “between holistic dualists and reductive materialists,” but rather the debate between holistic dualism and any form of physicalism (whether it be of the reductive or nonreductive variety). I state, “Yet there is a form of physicalism that doesn’t identify mental events with brain events. It is known as nonreductive physicalism. According to this view, the brain is still the ultimate reality. But brains, due to their complexity, can secrete mental events (such as choices) as by-products.” (HWLOM p. 5) and later, “Is it possible that this is Wilder and Thompson’s view, rather than reductive physicalism? Perhaps.” (HWLOM p. 56).
This non-reductive physicalism is still a form of physicalism. Therefore, my concern is with Wilder and Thompson’s physicalism per se, regardless of the variety. This frames the rest of my conversation in Chapter 3: “[L]et’s suppose Wilder and Thompson are in fact nonreductive physicalists. Does this provide a helpful way forward for them? It does not.” (HWLOM p. 58). I transition to my critique of Wilder and Thompson’s anthropology with these words, “In the next Chapter, I’ll draw out the wrong conclusions and applications that follow from their physicalist assumption, regardless of whether reductive or nonreductive physicalism is assumed.” (HWLOM p. 62).
IMPLICIT PHYSICALISM IS MORE CONCERNING
Third, Holsclaw observes that “Thompson and Wilder never explicitly argue against traditional understandings of the soul….” (paragraph 4). But my concern is just this: they simply assume a physicalist anthropology, without supporting this assumption theologically, philosophically, or scientifically. These assertions–cited throughout HWLOM–include, “[T]he terms brain and mind . . . are . . . closely enough related to seem interchangeable.” (Thompson, Anatomy, p. 9), Mind is “an embodied and relational process, emerging from and within and between brains.” (Thompson, Anatomy, p. 29), “Mind comes from the same brain structures that produce mindfulness and mindsight.” (Wilder, Renovated, p. 37) and “Our brain creates and maintains a human identity.” (Wilder, Renovated, p. 68). It is very hard to read these and many other similar passages and not conclude Thompson and Wilder are physicalists!
Therefore, my ultimate concern is that their physicalism, of any stripe, has deeply concerning implications for human flourishing (discussed in Chapters 9 and 10). These concerns are only heightened because Wilder and Thompson simply assume this anthropology, without offering arguments in its favor (which would also alert readers to the many reasons to reject physicalism, which I outline in my book).
MY DUALISM IS HOLISTIC, NOT CARTESIAN
Fourth, Holsclaw’s review seems to miss the crucial distinction I make in HWLOM between Cartesian and Holistic Dualism, the latter affirming the fundamental role the brain plays in thinking, feeling, choosing, and so on. For instance, he writes, “Because Wallace argues that personal identity, human individuation, and moral character all belong exclusively to the soul, he sees any attempts to connect these to brain activity as implicitly reducing the mind to the brain, which for him implies physicalism.” (paragraph 6) and I am “placing all mental activity on the side of the soul beyond the brain” (paragraph 8).
Granted, personal identity and individuation are properties of the soul (and I give reasons for this regarding personal identity on pages 72-77). Yet throughout I argue that our awareness of such facts, as well as all other features of our “mental activity [and] character formation” are not exclusive to the soul, but fundamentally involve the brain while embodied. (See especially Chapter 6).
WILDER AND THOMPSON ARE DOING METAPHYSICS
Fifth, in paragraph 8 Holsclaw makes the distinction between the “theoretical” and “practical” aspects of this conversation by his analogy of a car mechanic and driving instructor. A car mechanic is interested in the technical aspects of the car–its inner workings. On the other hand, a driving instructor is simply interested in the practical aspect of a car: how it can help someone learn to drive. His point is that Wilder and Thompson are not focusing on the technical theological or philosophical workings of the soul (the metaphysics), but rather the practical outworks: “how to love God and love others better.” Therefore, so argues Holsclaw, it is unfair to critique Thompson and Wilder for not being mechanics (theorists) when they are writing as driving instructors (practitioners).
This would be fine if Wilder and Thompson restricted their comments to the practical, pastoral issues—being a “driving instructor.” In fact, in their practical, pastoral passages Thompson and Wilder provide very good advice that helps many (which I note several times in HWLOM). Yet my concern is when they are writing as mechanics–making claims about the nature of the person. For example, Thompson claims that “The left hemisphere [of the brain] sets me apart as ‘me.’” (Anatomy, p. 244), and Wilder states that it is “the brain system that forms and changes character.” (Renovated, p. 39). Contrary to Holsclaw’s categorization (paragraph 7), these are claims clearly in the “theoretical” realm–claims about what we are (beings set apart as us by our brain, which also generates our character). These are claims of metaphysics: “the philosophical investigation of the nature, constitution, and structure of reality.”[1]
Therefore, in these (and many other) passages Wilder and Thompson are speaking as “mechanics” (metaphysicians) without the technical training to do so. As a result, they make a number of very misleading claims that have significant implications (again, see HWLOM Chapters 9 and 10). That is the concern that led me to write HWLOM.
I DEEPLY VALUE WHAT WE LEARN FROM SCIENCE
Sixth, Holsclaw worries that in HWLOM I devalue science, stating, “His argument, unfortunately, positions the two sides antagonistically, as if faith (philosophy and theology) were a corrective to reason (neuroscience).” (paragraph 12). But this is simply false. I repeatedly affirm science as an equal partner at the table of knowledge, providing us with much understanding of the physical world. For instance, I write, “God takes great delight in the study of his creation. One way in which we study God’s creation is through science….neuroscientists are making great strides in developing a better understanding of the brain’s intricacies.” (HWLOM p. 15).
It is not the findings of science, including neuroscience, that my book seeks to correct. Rather, it is the underlying interpretation of the findings of neuroscience that concern me. This is a central theme of my third and fourth chapters.
Furthermore, I eschew the “faith vs. reason” dichotomy. Rather, I affirm that science as well as theology and philosophy all provide us with knowledge. Our job is to work to integrate all we know about what we are from these fields into an integrated whole. (See, for instance, HWLOM p. 28-29 and 104-107.)
THE NEW TESTAMENT’S USE OF “MIND” AND “SOUL”
Finally, Holsclaw is also concerned that I don’t follow the New Testament’s use of the term “mind.” (paragraph 12). I agree, as I discuss in Chapter 2, because various terms are used in the New Testament for the various biblical author’s purposes. But my point, following the detailed exegesis by John Cooper in his Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, is that “body” and “soul” (or “mind” if referring to our entire immaterial dimension and not just our cognitive abilities) are the best terms to capture the truth taught in Scripture about our material and immaterial dimensions. This best allows us to take into account all the nuances in the Scriptures regarding our spiritual life, to which Holsclaw refers in paragraph 15.
IN CONCLUSION
I am thankful for Holsclaw’s review of HWLOM. His tone was congenial, and I believe his observations helped move the conversation forward. I trust my reply has helped bolster the conversation as well. I also appreciate Holsclaw pointing us to Matthew LaPine’s The Logic of the Body: Retrieving Theological Psychology. This looks very promising to advance still further this much-needed discussion concerning what we are and therefore how we flourish.
[1] “Metaphysics” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, General Editor Robert Audi.