We are all tempted to be chronological snobs, assuming what is fashionable to believe during our day and age must be right. This means we also assume those of previous times, who have different ideas and values, must be wrong. C.S. Lewis was able to resist this temptation. He stands as a model of how we might do the same, and how doing so will be a great benefit to us.
Leave a CommentStan W. Wallace, DMin Posts
During my recent sabbatical, I read more of C.S. Lewis’ fiction and non-fiction. Once again, I was mesmerized by his writing, and how clearly and forcefully, yet gently, he communicated vital truths. I think part of his appeal is that he is, in his own words, a “dinosaur.” I, for one, would like to more like him in this. Let me explain.
1 CommentIn this final post of the series, I’ll outline a third and final objection raised as an internal conceptual problem for Arminianism. If valid, it is an important problem faced by Arminian soteriology (doctrine of salvation). After offering three responses, I’ll summarize all five points of the argument in favor of the Arminian understanding of predestination and free will which I’ve covered in these 19 posts.
3 CommentsTwo potential internal conceptual problems remain for the Arminian understanding of salvation. If so, these are reasons to reconsider the strength of the other reasons I gave in favor of Arminianism. However, as I’ll argue today, at least the first of these remaining two objections turn out not to be an internal conceptual problem for Arminianism.
Leave a CommentWe have concluded our review of biblical data discussing Calvinism and Arminianism, as well as internal and external conceptual problems that arise for Calvinism. This seems to tip the scales in favor of the Arminian understanding. But Calvinists argue there are three internal conceptual problems for Arminianism that are sufficient to disqualify this view. In this case, the Calvinist understanding of predestination and free will is vindicated. I’ll discuss the first of these in this post.
2 CommentsSo far we’ve explored three external conceptual problems for the soft determinist/Calvinist view of freedom, and, thus the Calvinist view of election. Yet there are still two more external conceptual problems we must consider before drawing a final conclusion.
3 CommentsLast week I suggested our common experience of character formation is incompatible with the soft determinist view of freedom. Since Calvinism depends on soft determinism being true, this is another external conceptual problem for Calvinism. Yet the Calvinist may object on theological grounds. I’ll explore this response today.
Leave a CommentWe all desire to become better people. And so we work toward this goal. This includes choosing the beliefs and desires we will embrace and act upon. These choices in turn form our character. This common experience must fit our view of freedom. Yet, this reality doesn’t fit well with the soft determinist’s understanding of freedom. This is another external conceptual problem for soft determinism, and therefore, for Calvinism, which depends on soft determinism’s definition of freedom being true.
4 Comments